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Abstract
Capital accumulation has been a major issue in fisheries economics
over the last two decades, whereby the interaction of the fish and capital
stocks were of particular interest. Because bio-economic systems are in-
trinsically complex, previous efforts in this field have relied on a variety
of simplifying assumptions. The model presented here relaxes some of
these simplifications. Problems of tractability are surmounted by using
the methodology of qualitative differential equations (QDE). The theory
of QDEs takes into account that scientific knowledge about particular fish-
eries is usually limited, and facilitates an analysis of the global dynamics
of systems with more than two ordinary differential equations. The model
is able to trace the evolution of capital and fish stock in good agreement
with observed patterns, and shows that over-capitalization is unavoidable
in unregulated fisheries.
1 Introduction
Following sustained interest from policy makers, recent years have seen a num-
ber of bio-economic models examining the effects of commercial fisheries on ma-
rine resources. Even though over-fishing has been a fact since historical times
(Jackson et al., 2001), the problem has gained a new quality due to the indus-
trialization of fisheries (Fao, 2004). In particular the latter has reduced fish
biomass by 80% within 15 years of exploitation (Myers and Worm, 2003). In
this context, the impact of capital accumulation has been a major issue in fish-
eries economics over the last two decades (Clark et al., 1979; McKelvey, 1985;
Boyce, 1995; Jørgensen and Kort, 1997; Munro, 1999; Pauly et al., 2002). In
these contributions, commercial fisheries is portrayed as a system in which a
biological stock and a capital stock interact dynamically. As the capital stock
is highly specialized and cannot readily be converted to other uses, investment
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decisions are characterized by irreversibility, which is assumed as a major cause
of over-fishing.
The previous literature has treated capital accumulation in various settings.
Clark et al. (1979) study the optimal management strategy for a renewable re-
source with irreversible investment, assuming that marginal investment costs are
constant. The latter assumption is abandoned by Boyce (1995) on the grounds
that constant investment costs imply an immediate jump in the capital stock,
which is then followed by a period of decline in both the capital and fish stock.
Contrary, observed patterns of capital accumulation are characterized by an
initial phase of continuous growth of fleet size. Assuming increasing marginal
investment costs leads to better agreement with observations, but makes the
model more complicated. Considerations of tractability therefore lead Boyce
(1995) to assume that harvest productivity is independent of the size of the
biological stock.
In contrast to these optimal-exploitation models, approaches which study
capital accumulation in more realistic settings are rare. An exception is McKelvey
(1985, 1986) who examines an open-access fishery with irreversible investment
under both perfect and imperfect competition. But the increased realism of
these models comes at a cost in that marginal investment costs and harvesting
productivity are kept constant in the analysis of out-of-equilibrium behaviour
due to serious analytical difficulties. In general, the variety of modelling strate-
gies pursued in the literature thus reflects the tension between realism and
tractability, illustrating the need for new concepts in integrated modelling (cf.
Knowler, 2002; Mu¨ller, 2003). In order to keep them accessible to analysis, most
of the models mentioned above disregard at least one of these difficulties, e.g.
those relating to investment costs, harvesting productivity, or industry struc-
ture. In many cases the difficulties restrict analysis to equilibria or comparative
dynamics in the neighbourhood of an equilibrium1. But since fisheries systems
tend to stay far away from equilibrium, e.g. when catches reside above the max-
imum sustainable yield, there exists an urgent need for the analysis of the en-
folding dynamics. A common approach to this task is phase plane analysis. Al-
though this technique is not impossible for systems with more than two ordinary
differential equations (ODEs), it becomes rather difficult (cf. Berck and Perloff,
1984). Another technique to tackle tractability problems might be to run an
ensemble of numerical simulations or to use methods from nonlinear analysis
(e.g. bifurcation analysis or computing domains of attraction) rather than solv-
ing analytical models. These approaches are limited if precise parameters and
exact functional specifications are not completely available. In fact, as pointed
out by Clark (1999), our understanding of bio-economic systems is characterized
by low levels of knowledge. The dynamics of fish stocks, the economic charac-
teristics and strategies of the fishing industry are subject to a serious lack of
information (cf. Pindyck, 1984; Charles, 2001).
In this paper we demonstrate a qualitative simulation technique which com-
plements phase space analysis and numerical simulation in data-poor settings
when nonlinear dynamics far from equilibrium are to be investigated. The
method, developed in the field of artifical intelligence (c.f. de Kleer and Brown,
1984; Forbus, 1990; Kuipers, 1994), starts from the argument that imprecise un-
1Even with one state and one control variable the analysis of the comparative dynamics
can become difficult (Caputo, 1989, 2003). However, some papers investigate the dynamic
properties of trajectories more thoroughly (e.g. Jørgensen and Kort, 1997; Scheffran, 2000).
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derstanding can be formalized and used for a variety of model-based tasks (e.g.
identification of general dynamic properties, scenario testing, hypothesis explo-
ration, policy advice). The approach allows all possible dynamic behaviours
of the system to be characterized and classified on the basis of purely qualita-
tive relationships (i.e. in the absence of quantitative information). It is used to
an increasing extent in several fields (Farley and Lin, 1990; Benaroch and Dhar,
1995, economics and finance), (Heidtke and Schulze-Kremer, 1998; Trelease et al.,
1999, epidemiology and genetics), (Juniora and Martin, 2000, chemistry), (Guerrin and Dumas,
2001; Bredeweg and Salles, 2003, ecology), (Eisenack and Kropp, 2001; Petschel-Held and Lu¨deke,
2001; Kropp et al., 2002; Schellnhuber et al., 2002, sustainability science), but
seldom in bio-economics so far.
We use qualitative simulation to investigate the dynamics of capital accu-
mulation in unregulated fisheries with nonlinear investment costs and stock-
dependent harvesting productivity. Our model is able to trace the evolution of
capital and fish stocks in good agreement with observed patterns. A main result
is that the model necessarily produces a period where the capital stock contin-
ues to rise even after the harvest has started to decline, i.e. the development
of excess capacities is unavoidable. In general the paper shows that qualitative
models allow us to derive robust properties of bio-economic systems when we
have only weak knowledge at hand.
We have organized this paper as follows: in section 2 the basics of qualitative
modelling are introduced. Section 3 develops an analytical model of capital
accumulation in fisheries. In section 4 we generalize this model to a qualitative
one to characterize its global dynamic features. In section 5 we compare the
results with some development paths recently observed in industrial fishery and
draw general implications for fisheries management and the applicability of the
QDE method. A discussion and a summary conclude the paper.
2 Foundations of Dynamical Qualitative Mod-
elling
Qualitative differential equations (QDEs) are a prominent methodology in qual-
itative modelling. For this goal Kuipers (1994) has developed the QSIM runtime
environment whose underlying concept is used for the analyses presented here2.
In the following we describe the basic ideas of QDEs and provide the neces-
sary technical terms (written in italics). For a more detailed introduction and
a thorough overview of applications we refer to Kuipers (1994). The input for
a modelling task is a qualitative differential equation (QDE) comprising the
following parts:
1. a set of continuously differentiable functions (variables) of time;
2. a quantity space for each variable, specified in terms of an ordered set of
symbolic landmarks;
2The original ‘QSIM simulator’ was written in LISP and is available at
http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/qr/QR-software.html. For this paper we used
a faster C-based version which was developed at the Potsdam Institute for Cli-
mate Impact Research on the basis of Kuipers’ work. Together with a user
guide, the source code of the used and other related models it is provided under
http://www.pik-potsdam.de/~kropp/compromise/qsim-bioecon.html.
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3. a set of constraints expressing the algebraic, differential or monotonic re-
lationships between the variables.
A QDE can be considered as an abstract description (abstraction, cf. Fig. 1) of
a set of ordinary differential equations (ODEs). The abstraction is attained in
a twofold manner: (i) variables take values from the set of symbolic landmarks
or intervals between landmarks. Each landmark represents a real number, e.g.
maximum sustainable yield, of which the exact quantitative value may be un-
known. Nevertheless, it is analytically distinguished whether the catch is above
or below this threshold. The landmark or the interval between landmarks where
the value of a variable is at a given time, is called its qualitative magnitude. (ii)
Monotonic relationships specified between variables, e.g. that the yield is mono-
tonically decreasing with a decreasing stock, are expressed by constraints. This
is an abstraction in the sense that the constraint comprises an entire family of
(linear and nonlinear) monotonic functions. The only requirement is that these
functions are smooth and that their derivatives have certain signs. Qualitative
simulation achieves its result by performing a constraint satisfaction scheme
(for a general introduction see Tsang, 1993; Dechter, 2003), where all combi-
nations of qualitative magnitudes inconsistent with the constraints are filtered
out. Due to continuity of the variables’ values in time, the scheme addition-
ally checks which admissible combinations of qualitative magnitudes can occur
after other combinations, called successors. The guaranteed coverage theorem
(an in-depth discussion of this theorem is beyond the scope of this paper, see
Kuipers, 1994, p.118) ensures that the algorithm predicts an abstract descrip-
tion of all solutions to any ODE described by the given QDE. This implies, due
to the indeterminacy of analysed systems, that a QDE solution comprises not
only one time development, but a set of trajectories.
In the following we illustrate these concepts considering a simple nonlinear
model, which is not meant to solve real-world problems (it will be extended in
the succeeding sections). Consider a natural resource stock x with an associated
Figure 1: Relationships between ordinary (ODE) and qualitative differential
equations (QDE). A reasoning process indicated by the dashed arrows is infea-
sible if we want to achieve all numerical solutions. This becomes possible by
qualitative simulation (solid arrows) since this allows a complete computation
of systems development.
recruitment function R(x). The industry chooses effort depending on x such that
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there is a harvest function h(x). The time behaviour of the stock is expressed
as
x˙ = R(x)− h(x). (1)
It is assumed that h(0) = 0, and that h is strictly increasing in x. The re-
cruitment function is of logistic type and attains a maximum MSY (maximum
sustainable yield) at xMSY . Furthermore, R(0) = R(Q) = 0, where Q denotes
the carrying capacity of the biological system. For x < xMSY the function R
is strictly increasing, but strictly decreasing if x > xMSY . In the first abstrac-
tion step, for each variable the following sets of symbolic landmarks are defined
(including lower and upper bounds):
x : 0 < xMSY < Q < xmax,
h : 0 < MSY < hmax, (2)
R : 0 < RMSY < Rmax.
For a given time t and a (continuous) value for x(t), h(t) and R(t) one can
determine the qualitative magnitudes with respect to the defined landmarks,
e.g. as an interval h(t) ∈ (MSY, hmax), if h > MSY , or as a singular landmark,
e.g. h(t) = MSY . Qualitative simulation explicitly tracks the direction of
change of all variables in the model, which is called qualitative direction. The
arrow ↓ portrays that a variable is decreasing (i.e. x˙(t) < 0), ↑ increasing
(x˙(t) > 0), and a circle ◦ that x˙(t) = 0 at a given time t. The qualitative
magnitude together with the qualitative direction of a variable at a given time
is called its qualitative value, e.g. written as
〈
(MSY, hmax), ↑
〉
. The qualitative
values of all variables of the model calculated for a certain time is called the
qualitative state of the system.
In the second abstraction step the constraints of the na¨ive model are formu-
lated as relationships between the variables and their derivatives. To simplify
the presentation we only introduce the most important constraints of the model
(for the whole model we refer to the annex and to the download version; cf.
footnote 2).
Since hx > 0
3, h˙ = hx(x) · x˙ and h(0) = 0, using the the sign operator sgn(·),
sgn(h˙) = sgn(x˙) and x = 0⇔ h = 0. (3)
We define RMSY := R(xMSY ) and describe the relation between stock and
recruitment by the monotonicity assumptions mentioned above by:
if x = 0 then R = 0, (4)
x = xMSY if, and only if R = RMSY , (5)
if x = Q then R = 0, (6)
if x < xMSY then sgn(R˙) = sgn(x˙) and R < RMSY , (7)
if x = xMSY then R˙ = 0 and R = RMSY , (8)
if x > xMSY then sgn(R˙) = −sgn(x˙) and R < RMSY . (9)
The relation x˙ = R− h implies
if R < RMSY and h > MSY then x˙ < 0, (10)
3For the sake of readability the first partial derivative of a function f with respect to X is
denoted as fX and the second derivative as fXX .
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indicating that a recruitment below and a harvest above a sustainable level
leads to a decreasing stock. It is obvious, due to the indeterminacy of the
relations, that many functions exist which comply with these constraints (see,
e.g. Fig. 2a), but nonetheless a complete qualitative simulation is possible. It
Figure 2: (a) Representation of imprecise knowledge in a QDE model. Shown
are some possible realizations of recruitment functions (dashed lines) satisfying
the constraints (4)–(9). The uncertainty intervals regarding the landmarks are
indicated by brackets. For R(xMSY ) all values are possible lying in the cross-
hatched area. (b) An example for the qualitative behaviour of harvest h(t)
(dotted line). Such a behaviour is representative for a class of (quantitative)
time developments as indicated by the dashed lines (grey areas).
starts with a qualitative state as initial value at time t0. Supposing that at the
beginning the fishery is characterized by an almost unexploited biological stock
and catches above MSY , the qualitative state at t0 is given by
x(t0) =
〈
(xMSY , Q), ↓
〉
, h(t0) =
〈
(MSY, hmax), ↓
〉
, R(t0) =
〈
(0, RMSY ), ↑
〉
.
(11)
The qualitative magnitude of R results from the qualitative magnitude of x
(above xMSY ) by applying constraint (9). The qualitative direction of x (de-
creasing) is a consequence of the qualitative magnitudes of h andR, i.e. rule (10).
Constraint (9) forces R to increase. Finally, h decreases due to constraint (3).
A time evolution is now initiated by these starting conditions, which has to
respect the direction of changes shown in Eqs. (11) and the defined constraints.
For the example three possible evolutions can be distinguished:
(i) x decreases below xMSY , where h still resides above MSY at this time.
(ii) h decreases below MSY , while x stays above xMSY at this time.
(iii) x decreases below xMSY and h decreases below MSY at the same time.
These ‘events’ (occurring at a time t1 > t0) lead to new (and different) quali-
tative states. Qualitative simulation checks which of these states comply with
all constraints of a defined QDE. Those states ‘surviving’ this test are the suc-
cessors valid for the next time interval. For case (i), we obtain the following
qualitative state as a successor:
x(t1, t2) =
〈
(0, xMSY ), ↓
〉
, h(t1, t2) =
〈
(MSY, hmax), ↓
〉
, R(t1, t2) =
〈
(0, RMSY ), ↓
〉
.
Here t2 indicates the time point until the calculated state is valid (i.e. a new
‘event’ will occur). The value of x is the direct outcome of case (i), where
6
constraint (7) determines the value of R. The magnitude of h is unchanged
(since otherwise, we would be in case (iii)). Decreasing harvest is the result of
constraint (3). By similar arguments, case (ii) leads to the successor
x(t1, t2) =
〈
(xMSY , Q), ↓
〉
, h(t1, t2) =
〈
(0,MSY ), ↓
〉
, R(t1, t2) =
〈
(0, RMSY ), ↑
〉
.
Case (iii) is neglected here, because it is very unlikely that both harvest and
recruitment drop below MSY exactly at the same time. In the semantics of
qualitative simulation the exclusion of so-called marginal cases or other specific
assumptions can be explicitly defined (cf. annex).
In the next time steps (valid for the intervals (t2, t3); (t3, t4); . . .) qualitative
simulation takes into account all successors and performs the same consistency
checks as introduced above. The procedure is repeated until the system attains
an equilibrium, no new successor is possible or until it enters a cycle. A logical
sequence of successors is called qualitative behaviour and represents a qualitative
dynamical trajectory. It should be emphasized here that a single behaviour
represents a set of quantitative development paths (including all solutions of
an ODE respecting the constraints, Fig. 2b). Since for some states more than
one successor might be possible, all states and their possible sequences have
to be displayed as a state-transition graph (STG). Figure 3 shows the STG
for the example. Each vertex represents a consistent qualitative state. If one
state is a successor of another, they are connected by an edge (arrow). Each
qualitative behaviour can be traced as a path along edges through the graph.
However, for more complex bio-economic models the number of states typically
increases rapidly. In these cases a clustering algorithm can be applied to provide
a further structuring of the graph. For the algorithm, the modeller has to
specify a set of relevant (state) variables of the model. All states with identical
qualitative values of the relevant variables are automatically joined to clusters.
In the generalized state-transition graph (GSTG) each cluster is represented by
a single vertex. Its edges are inherited from the STG. More formally, each vertex
in the GSTG is an equivalence class of vertices in the STG with respect to the
qualitative value of the relevant variables. There is an edge from a vertex v (a
class of qualitative states) to a vertex w (another class) if there exists at least one
edge in the STG where a qualitative state in w is the successor of a qualitative
state in the class v. This representation allows solutions of high-dimensional
models to be displayed in a concise manner.
Comparing the QDEmethod with Monte Carlo simulations or Markov chains,
one has to emphasize that it is a deterministic approach. In contrast to prob-
abilistic methods, qualitative modelling determines possible transitions for the
systems development in the logical sense. This is quite different to techniques
propagating changes on the basis of likelihoods, e.g. by transition matrices (for
an example of such approaches cf. Erev and Roth, 1998). It is in general not
possible to derive probabilities in the case of multiple successors of a single state,
since these also depend on qualitative states visited before (the Markov property
is violated). Furthermore, due to various uncertainties, it is often impossible
to measure sufficient frequency records. A QDE is a compact representation of
a large family of ODEs, and the simulation result includes all their solutions.
The result is rather general in nature, since no parameters need to be speci-
fied. Therefore, the result of qualitative simulation is not exactly the same as
of common phase-plane analysis. There, multiple cases due to the number of
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Figure 3: State-transition graph (STG) for the solution set of the na¨ive model.
The arrows in the vertices (boxes) indicate the qualitative direction of the rel-
evant variables: h: harvest and x: stock. The position in the diagram refers
to the qualitative magnitude, and the arrows between the boxes describe pos-
sible changes of qualitative states in time. Circles represent equilibrium states.
All states with a qualitative magnitude of h > MSY are characterized by a
decreasing stock and harvest. Below the MSY level x and h both decrease or
increase. One of the equilibria represents extinction (x = h = 0), one a steady
state below xMSY , another an equilibrium above this landmark.
intersections of the main isoclines (where the derivatives of some state variables
vanish) have to be specified (as in, e.g. Cropper et al., 1979) – depending on
the concrete parameterization, which is not known to the modeller in our case.
For the same reasons, different cases regarding stability of equilibria, bifurca-
tions and other phenomena studied in nonlinear analysis are contained in one
qualitative model. In the STG one circle may represent multiple equilibria of
different types. If the modeller wants to exclude or distinguish some cases, ad-
ditional equilibria must be made explicit by introducing new landmarks and
linking them with appropriate constraints.
3 A Fishery Model with Capital Accumulation
In this section we introduce a bio-economic model describing a situation where
N identical and profit-maximizing firms compete for an unregulated resource,
i.e. a marine fish stock with the size x. Because the harvesting technology
and the associated cost and profit functions have been formulated in several
ways in the previous literature (Clark et al., 1979; McKelvey, 1985; Boyce, 1995;
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Amundsen et al., 1995), we start by deriving a generic formulation based on
standard production economics. Assume that any harvesting requires variable
inputs (labour, fuel, material), jointly referred to as effort e, and fixed inputs k
(capital, e.g. ships and gear). The productivity of these inputs depends on the
biological stock x. Thus, a production function f(e, x, k) can be defined, that
determines the resulting harvest h ≥ 0. For its partial derivatives the properties
fe, fx, fk > 0, fee, fkk, fxx < 0, fex, fek, fxk > 0 are imposed. The first two sets
of inequalities describe the standard properties of positive, decreasing marginal
productivity. The third set of inequalities means that the marginal product of
the variable input decreases with decreasing fish stock, but is raised by capital
accumulation. The derivative of harvest with respect to the fish stock also in-
creases in capital, because certain attributes of capital enhance the accessibility
of the fish stock (improved fishing gear and technology, increased horsepower of
boats, etc.).
Since x and k are given when a firm undertakes efforts e to obtain a chosen
h, the resulting variable costs v depend on h, x and k. The function v(h, x, k)
can be determined by solving h = f(e, x, k) for e and multiplying it with a
renumeration rate w which is assumed to be fixed. Due to the assumptions
made for f , the implicit function theorem implies that
vh > 0, vx, vk < 0,
vhh, vkk, vxx, vkx > 0, (12)
vhx, vhk < 0.
Additionally, we assume that the Hessian of v is positive definite, which is
no contradiction to the above inequalities. This guarantees usual convexity
properties as needed later on. It should be noted that the marginal harvesting
costs vh decrease in both the fish stock and the capital stock. This assumption
differs from previous approaches where capital only sets an upper limit for the
harvest, such that an increase in capital equipment improves the productivity
of the variable inputs, and capital accumulation may offset the negative effect
of a declining fish stock on harvesting costs.
We now turn to the dynamics of the economic and biological stock. The
regeneration of the resource is given by a concave recruitment function R(x),
for which the assumptions made in section 2 are valid. We define
x˙ = R(x)− (h+ h′) (13)
as the equation of motion, where h denotes the harvest of a firm under consid-
eration and h′ that of all the others. Each firm’s capital stock is described by
k˙ = I − δk, (14)
where I ≥ 0 represents (irreversible) investment and δ the depreciation rate
which is assumed to be constant. Investment costs are expressed by a strictly
convex increasing function c(I). The convexity reflects inelastic supply of highly
specialized equipment and rising adjustment costs for higher investment. The
demand for fish is described by the downward sloping inverse demand function
p(h+ h′).
In the following the decision of each firm on h and I has to be determined.
If each fishing company acts in an economically rational way, it chooses an
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investment and harvest plan that maximizes the discounted profit given by
Π :=
∫
J
e−rt
(
p(h+ h′)h− v(h, x, k)− c(I)
)
dt (15)
subject to Eq. (13) and Eq. (14). Here, r denotes a constant discount rate and
J = [0, T ] a planning interval.
The optimization problem can be solved by a sufficiency theorem of Man-
gasarian(1966). By introducing λ and µ as costate variables for x and k, the
current-value Lagrangian is given by
L = p(h+h′)h−v(h, x, k)−c(I)+λ
(
R(x)−(h+h′)
)
+µ
(
I−δk
)
+σ1h+σ2I+σ3x+σ4k.
(16)
The four slack variables appear due to the constraints I, h, x, k ≥ 0. Since L is
concave in (x, k), an interior solution to the first-order conditions Lh = LI = 0
and the costate conditions Lx = rλ − λ˙ and Lk = rµ − µ˙ (where σ1 = σ2 =
σ3 = σ4 = 0) with λ, µ ≥ 0 and λ(T ) = µ(T ) = 0 is an optimal path. We
assume that marginal investment costs become small for a low investment level,
i.e. cI(0) = 0, avoiding that there is a negative solution of LI = −cI(I) +µ = 0
since cII > 0. It is not as easy to guarantee a non-negative solution of Lh = 0,
which depends on the relation between prices and variable costs. However,
we do not investigate the optimal path in detail since it may be unrealistic
because firms are most likely to ignore the effect of their harvesting decision
on future stocks (Harris, 1998; Banks, 1999; Hatcher, 2000). In other words,
they disregard Eq. (13) in their optimization procedure, partly because of a lack
of knowledge on the recruitment function, and partly because they consider
their own influence on the fish stock to be negligible. Moreover, they tend to
assume that other firms behave in the same way. Thus, we suppose that the
shadow price for the biological stock is neglected by the individual firms. We
further assume that the number of firms is constant and investment takes place
in the form of increasing fishing power or number of vessels per firm. From this
perspective it is consistent to set λ ≡ 0 in the fourth summand of the current-
value Hamiltonian Eq. (16). As a consequence, the costate condition for λ is
ignored and corner solutions of Hh = 0 become irrelevant. The harvest decision
is myopic in contrast to the investment decision. Utilizing the (constant) inverse
price elasticity of demand ǫ < 1, one obtains the following equations:
Lh =
(
1− ǫ
h
h+ h′
)
p(h+ h′)− vh = 0, (17)
LI = −cI(I) + µ = 0, (18)
Lk = −vk − µδ = rµ− µ˙. (19)
According to Eq. (18) the costate variable on capital equals the marginal cost of
investment. If the latter were constant, as assumed in several previous models,
Eq. (19) would therefore boil down to the usual condition that the user cost of
capital, (r + δ)cI , should just be balanced by the induced reduction in variable
costs, −vk. In our model with increasing marginal investment costs we get a
more complicated equation. By substituting µ from Eq. (18) and its time deriva-
tive in Eq. (19) one gets (r+ δ)cI = −vk + c˙I , where c˙I = cII I˙. The investment
programme is characterized by the condition that the user cost of capital should
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be balanced not only by reduced variable costs, but also by the change in the
purchase cost of capital induced by a change in the level of investment.
Because we have assumed that all firms are characterized by the same tech-
nology and behave in the same way, one obtains h+h′ = Nh. Consequently, the
total amount of capital and investment is given by N · k and N · I, respectively.
Our model can therefore be written in the following way:
x˙ = R(x)−Nh, (20)
vh =
(
1−
ǫ
N
)
p(Nh), (21)
I˙ =
1
cII(I)
(
(r + δ)cI(I) + vk
)
, (22)
k˙ = I − δk. (23)
Equation (22) has already been interpreted above and Eq. (21) represents the
usual equality between marginal variable costs and marginal revenue. It should
be recalled that the marginal variable costs vh decrease in both the fish stock and
the capital stock. Therefore, an increase in marginal costs due to a decreasing
fish stock may trigger additional investment in an effort to keep marginal costs
from rising excessively. This is crucial for explaining why the capital stock may
increase along with a decrease in the fish stock, a phenomenon which is at the
heart of what is frequently referred to as over-capitalization. We will show in
the next section that this happens for every parameterization of the model.
To analyse whether over-capacities occur or not, and whether the fish stock
recovers once it is in a critical state, we are interested in the dynamics of the
ODE model Eq. (20)–(23) far from equilibrium. Due to the difficulties with
phase-plane analysis and numerical simulation as discussed before, we study
the QDE corresponding to the model in the next sections.
4 The Qualitative Model and its Solution
4.1 Abstraction of the Analytical Model
The abstraction procedure commences as outlined in section 2. At first, land-
marks for all variables are chosen and constraints about the functions are de-
fined. For the resource stock x, recruitment R and harvest h the same landmarks
as in section 2 are introduced. The constraints relating x to R and x˙ to R and
h are the same as given in (3)–(10) and (26). For capital and investment the
landmarks k : 0 < kmax and I : 0 < Imax are defined. Further descriptions of
the following constraints are provided in the annex.
Eq. (21) for the marginal variable costs vh can be solved for h to yield a
harvest supply function h(x, k). This function is increasing in both arguments,
which can be shown from the assumptions made for the production function
f(e, x, h) and the inverse demand function p, which implies
if x˙ > 0 and k˙ > 0 then h˙ > 0, (24)
if x˙ < 0 and k˙ < 0 then h˙ < 0.
The constraints following from Eq. (12) for vk are given by (27), those from
Eqs. (22) and (23) by (28)–(29) (cf. annex). For technical reasons vk is replaced
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by −vk : −vkmax < 0. This implies that −vk can be expressed by a function
which is strictly monotonically increasing in h and strictly monotonically de-
creasing in x and in k (cf. Eq. (12)). Further on, we assume that cII , r and
δ are constant. Since cI(0) = 0, it can be shown that I has always the same
sign and qualitative direction as the expression r+δ
cII
cI(I). Therefore, this term
of Eq. (22) can be simplified to I qualitatively. For the same reason δ · k can
be replaced by k (in Eq. 22), and N · h by h (in Eq. 20). Thus, the abstraction
of the model and the associated constraints as given by Eqs. (20)–(23) can be
expressed in the following relational form, where the right hand side represents
the typical notation developed by Kuipers (1994, cf. annex for further details):
x˙+ h = R ≡ ((add dx h R)(0 0 0)(0 MSY Rmsy))
R(x) = R ≡ ((U- x R)(0 0)(xmsy Rmsy)(Q 0))
h(x, k) = h ≡ (((M++) x k h)) (25)
k˙ + k = I ≡ ((add dk k I))
I˙ + (−vk) = I ≡ ((add dI mvk I))
f(h, x, k) = −vk ≡ (((M-++) h x k mvk))
The constraint add is the qualitative abstraction of quantitative addition. The
U- constraint represents a downward bent U-shaped function of logistic type
(cf. annex). The landmarks in the brackets are corresponding pairs/triples of
argument and result values specifying correspondences between variables, e.g.
in the first equation of (25): if x˙ = 0 and h = MSY , then R = RMSY .
4.2 Results
The qualitative simulation of the bio-economic model (see footnote 2) provides
467 qualitative states. According to the methodology described in section 2
the potential systems developments are structured and reorganized as a GSTG
(Fig. 4) with stock size, harvest and capital as relevant variables. The GSTG
contains 19 vertices, where one©A , represents a catastrophic equilibrium (where
x = 0). For each behaviour represented in the GSTG, corresponding phase
plots for the relevant variables are available. Now, the question about the real-
world validity of these trajectories and the added value for the discussion of the
problems in fisheries arises. Our argumentation follows three directions:
1. In order to validate the results obtained it can be checked whether case
studies can be reconstructed by observed time behaviours. As an example
we discuss the development of the blue whale fishery in the time period
1946-1980 (Fig. 5).
2. The qualitative approach determines all ‘dynamic patterns’ which are con-
ceivable under the model settings. The GSTG enables us to determine
general properties common to all time developments.
3. The GSTG has the capabilities to discuss potential management interven-
tions, e.g. for scenario analysis or for detection of serious developments.
In this sense the approach supplies knowledge for an ex-ante assessment.
The example of blue whale fishery (Fig. 5b) shows that the qualitative bio-
economic model fits real situations quite well. Figures 5a and 5c display the
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Figure 4: Solutions of the qualitative model represented as GSTG. The arrows in the vertices label the direction of the first derivative
(from left to right x˙, h˙, k˙), the dashed boxes indicate situations where over-capitalization occurs. Arrows between vertices indicate possible
transitions. The dashed and the white arrows indicate typical development paths (cf. text). The two bold arrows indicate management
interventions as discussed in section 5.1.
1
3
Figure 5: Qualitative phase plots for two critical developments observable in
fisheries (a,c). The boxed dot refers to a critical branching, where the resource
stock either vanishes or recovers. The numbers correspond to the qualitative
states in Fig. 4. (b) displays the situation in the blue whale hunting industry
from 1946–1980 (BWU ≡ blue whale units; the dashed lines refer to model
outputs generated by the McKelvey (1986) model, and N to the number of
firms in this model).
associated phase plots of the qualitative model, indicating a development path
corresponding to transitions from vertex #1 to #12 (Fig. 4, dashed-dotted and
white arrows). Both the observed quantitative and the qualitative case are
characterized by an initial expansion phase where the whale stock declines while
the capital stock increases. This is followed by a period in which the capital
stock declines rapidly, while the whale stock is still declining. Finally, the capital
decreases further, whereas the stock tardily recovers. This is completely different
to several models (e.g. Clark et al. 1979, McKelvey 1986, cf. Fig. 5b) which,
due to linearity assumptions, show an initial and a final jump of the capital
stock.
Since the GSTG contains many paths, we may wonder if every fishery show-
ing an intial expansion phase can be reconstructed by the model. However, in
the following we identify further structural properties of the graph – the model
can only explain real-world fisheries which reflect these patterns. During the ex-
pansion phase the stock decreases while capital is still increasing. In the course
of further evolution the effect of declining stocks on harvesting costs becomes
so important that it cannot compensated any longer by investment. Then the
capital stock begins to decrease, i.e. net investment I−δk becomes negative. At
this stage it is possible (Fig. 5a) that the fish stock approaches zero (a discussion
of such branching points is provided in section 5.2.). However, it is also possible
that the decline of the fish stock is reversed. In contrast to models like those of
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Clark et al. (1979) and McKelvey (1986), in this case fisheries do not need to
attain an equilibrium with x > 0, but can exhibit a further boom-and-bust cycle
through all quadrants. It is not even safeguarded that the system converges to
an equilibrium after repeated cycles.
We can also show that every fishery described by the model necessarily
undergoes a phase of over-capitalization. This is related to the fact that via
the simulation irreversible transitions are identified, i.e. transitions between
qualitative states which are possible only in one direction (cf. GSTG, e.g.,
from quadrant II to quadrant III). The proof of this proposition is as follows:
decreasing catches and increasing capital stock occur simultaneously, whenever
the system approaches the critical vertices #3, #6, #8 or #18. If the system
starts, for example, at vertex #1 (relatively undisturbed stock) and does not
directly shift to vertex #18, the only way to avoid vertex #3 is to change from
vertex #2 to #5. However, at #5 the only way for a further development
(without collapse of the stock) is via vertex #6. Thus, we always approach
at least one of the critical vertices and in this sense over-capitalization is an
unavoidable system property. This property is rooted in the fact that vhx < 0
and vhk < 0, i.e. that the harvest supply function increases in x and k (via
Eq. (21)). As long as we observe increasing harvest although the fish stock is
reduced, net investment must be positive to compensate losses from increasing
marginal costs. Therefore, k cannot start to decrease before h.
5 Discussion and Policy Implications
Discussing the results and implications for policy actions, a variety of conclusions
can be drawn. The model is further validated by showing that mistakes arising
from temporary management measures can be reconstructed by the model.
5.1 Why Management Fails
Public decision makers may respond rather late to an emerging crisis and, in
addition, with drastic, but temporary interventions. Such situations can be
analysed with the model as follows: although the system does not follow the
dynamics of an unregulated fishery during a period managed in this way, we can
compare the qualitative state of the system before and after this time frame.
Two such interventions are represented by the bold arrows in Fig. 4 starting at
the dashed vertex #8 and addressing the well-known problems in the cod fish-
eries of the North Atlantic ocean (Grand Bank and Barents Sea). The situation
in the Grand Bank region and in the Barents Sea exhibited similarities, but the
results of political interventions in these two cases were different. Whereas in
the Canadian case the worst consequences ensued, the Norwegian authorities
were able to prevent a severe disaster. The question arises, how and why?
The cod fiasco in the Canadian waters at the beginning of the 1970s is an
example of an maladjusted strategy leading to a severe economic and environ-
mental catastrophe. Anticipating an ecological disaster, the exclusive economic
zone (EEZ) was introduced in 1977 and foreign trawlers were banned from the
Grand Banks. The government implemented catch quotas which, however, were
not always binding. In parallel, the government responded with massive subsi-
dies to the fishery. The earliest situation when such a situation occurs in the
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Figure 6: Catch of Atlantic cod in the area of the Northwest Atlantic Fish-
ery Organization (Newfoundland, Grand Banks, area 2J3KL). The dashed line
indicates the increase in number of vessels (all countries targeting cod (gadus
morhua)) operating in this area and the diamonds the total allowable catch
(data from NAFO, 2002; DFO, 2002).
GSTG is at vertex #6 where the harvest is above the sustainable level and the
stock already below. The only way to avoid more serious developments is to
alter to vertex #7 (and from there to #9, #11, etc.), but this needs a reduction
of the capital. Indeed the Canadians did just the opposite, i.e. the awareness
of increasing gains due to the ban on European trawlers led to investment in
improved gear and to more efficient fish killing (Harris, 1998). The situation at
the end of the 1970s is represented by vertex #8 (Fig. 4), where both stocks and
catches are below a critical level and still decreasing while the capital continues
to increase. The reaction of the government in this situation was counterpro-
ductive (cf. bold black arrow in Fig. 4). It may be that the stocks slightly
recovered (possibly indicated by an increased catch, cf. Fig. 6), but they have
not reached a sustainable level (i.e. xMSY ). Thus, when the total allowable
catches (TAC) were relieved, the system was not in a safe state, but approached
a state represented in the model results by vertex #13. A second period of high
catch levels occurred, which led to the critical state #8 again (along the path
#13–#10–#8 or via #13–#10–#5–#6–#8), finally approaching ©A via # 9.
This was the end of the story, because the cod stock has not recovered up to
the present day.
To prevent these short-termed cycles, it would be better to shift the system
to vertex #15. This was the case in Norway when the country faced a simi-
lar disaster in the Barents Sea. Here, individual transferable quotas helped to
reduce the race for fish. Although there were a lot of bankruptcies in fisheries
and many demonstrations, the politicians knew that there could be no giving
in to protests for short-term political gain. They set up subsidies – in contrast
to the Canadians – to remove ships from fisheries and to diversify the coastal
economy(Harris, 1998). Finally, they banned fishing from spawning grounds.
This is equivalent to a path sequence via #8–#9–#11–#14–#15. Thus, Nor-
way now has a better basic position for a sustainable resource management.
However, a slackening of catch permits, as currently discussed, may lead to
the outcome that the unregulated dynamics starts again at vertex #15. We
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conclude from these two cases that short-term measures or non-binding catch
quotas only suspend the intrinsic problem.
5.2 Scenario Assessment and Critical Branchings
The GSTG provides various clues on how management interventions can be
implemented. Although some of them may not differ so much from earlier
conclusions (cf. those derived from the static model of Gordon, 1954), they
are here based on a comprehensive system analytical background and a full
dynamical perspective. For example, irreversible transitions indicate critical
stages in the development of the fishery. The fishery is in a ‘high-risk situation’
when stock and harvest are decreasing, but capital is still increasing and if
at least one irreversible transition occurred (from #3 to #6, or form #4 to
#7). Critical branchings are states characterized by multiple successors, where
at least one of them is an irreversible transition. Here, either a worsening or
mitigation is possible (e.g. #1, #2, #4, #9, or #13). Fishery management can
use the information represented by the GSTG and take account of the fisheries’
problems in two ways:
(i) How can it be avoided that the fishery returns again to critical branching
after the resource has recovered?
(ii) Under which conditions can critical branchings be prevented at an early
stage, i.e. that the system does not leave quadrants I and II?
We can consider control measures for harvest, capital, or stock, but also - in a
qualitative sense - the time when they have to be applied at the latest. It would
also be helpful to assign likelihoods to different transitions at these branch-
ings. Although results of the latter kind are problematic in this context (cf.
Sect. 2, last paragraph), the qualitative model provides a starting point for in-
vestigations in this direction. We illustrate these issues by referring again to the
example of the blue whale fishery (dashed-dotted arrows, Fig. 4). Assume that
we start with a relatively undisturbed stock and an industry at a low level (#1,
quadrant I, x > xMSY , h < MSY, x˙ < 0, h˙ > 0, k˙ > 0). The first irreversible
transition occurs from vertex #1 to #2 (quadrant II). Already here the catch ex-
ceeds the sustainable level (h > MSY ), while the capital stock is still increasing.
To avoid such a situation, strong harvest limitations must be introduced, i.e.
the harvest rate must decrease beforeMSY is reached and the stock approaches
xMSY , while over-capitalization might continue. For such a transition to node
#18 the following scenario is conceivable: the harvest costs already strongly
increase due to a reduced population although it is still above xMSY and/or the
substitution of resource by capital stock has only minor effects. In reality this is
observable for less developed fisheries. For highly developed fisheries the system
evolves to vertex #2 (quadrant II, x > xMSY , h > MSY, x˙ < 0, h˙ > 0, k˙ > 0,
cf. Fig. 5) representing fisheries having the potential to increase harvest and
capital (as, for instance, the blue whale fisheries between 1946-1960). A safe
development under these conditions can only be guaranteed if a transition to
vertex #5 or #6 is avoided. At vertex #2 this is possible via #3, where we are
still in quadrant II, but the situation is economically worse than at vertex #2,
because in addition to declining fish stocks, harvest is also decreasing. Sustain-
able limits can only be reached by massive harvest limitations (evolution via
17
#4–#17). If these actions are not implemented, the transition to #5 or #6 is
inescapable and fisheries necessarily enter to a situation in which the industry
and the fish stock are likely to be ruined©A . The further development depends
on how early net investment decreases, i.e. in the phase when quadrant III is
reached, effort controls are more important than catch controls. In contrast in
quadrant IV, successful recovery is determined by the regeneration rate of the
fish stock and the speed of harvest reduction. Since policy actions often have
the tendency to come into play too late, over-capitalization and therefore over-
exploitation is a permanent risk. Qualitative simulation shows that at these
vertices the collapse of the fishery can be prevented if, due to a rapid capital
reduction, the stock already recovers (indicated by the white arrows, Fig. 4). In
general the simulation results indicate that fisheries under the settings of the
model are in a state of perpetual risk, because the high risk states (#5–#9) are
likely to occur repeatedly in every boom-and-bust cycle.
We conclude that – if it is impossible to formulate a precise numerical model –
qualitative simulation has complementary advantages compared to other meth-
ods. First, we can shift the perspective from equilibria to non-equilibrium dy-
namics and can unveil general dynamic patterns, i.e. intrinsic properties of
unregulated fisheries which hold for every functional and parametric specifica-
tion of the model and which cannot be identified by comparative dynamics in a
neighbourhood of the equilibrium. Examples are unavoidable overcapacities and
the possibility of cyclical behaviour. Second, several stages of system develop-
ment can be identified to enhance our knowledge of how and when management
strategies should be introduced. This allows alternative scenarios to be dis-
cussed. Third, critical branchings were identified. These can be associated with
regions in the phase space where the qualitative direction of state variables are
in a configuration which admits irreversible problematic and positive changes.
In our model, factors for the propensity of the system to recover include (cf.
Eqs. (20)–(23)): (i) regeneration rate of the fish stock, (ii) depreciation of the
capital stock, (iii) marginal investment costs and (iv) marginal variable costs
with respect to capital and harvest. Here, qualitative reasoning comes to its
limits, since no numerical estimates for critical parameters can be made. Yet
we think that the method helps to identify decisive regions of the phase space
as a starting point for the development of new hypotheses focusing specifically
on them. Semi-quantitative techniques combining qualitative and quantitative
methods show promise here (cf. Berleant and Kuipers, 1998). Thus, qualitative
reasoning is appropriate whenever we are dealing with imprecise knowledge.
Given the complexity of the systems in question it must be accepted that one
may have to be content with “soft prognoses” only.
6 Conclusion
This paper addresses the global problem of industrial unregulated fisheries and
the role of capital accumulation. Such systems are often intrinsically complex
and the understanding of them is limited by low levels of knowledge with respect
to both biological and economic properties. To keep models tractable, previous
analytical approaches have relied on a variety of simplifying assumptions with
respect to investment costs, harvesting costs or industry structure. Additionally,
they often concentrated on equilibrium analysis or on comparative dynamics
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near equilibrium. We demonstrated qualitative modelling as a new method
to approach uncertainty and tractability problems by applying it to a model
which improves former results by relaxing assumptions. The qualitative model
describes the dynamical behaviour of a fishery without reference to quantitative
values. We have shown that this technique can improve our reasoning about
global properties of the dynamics of the system.
The model features (i) increasing marginal investment costs and (ii) marginal
harvesting costs that are decreasing in both the fish and the capital stock. Due to
the former, the build-up of fishing capacities can be modelled more realistically.
Due to the latter, fish stock and capital stock are (incomplete) substitutes in
the production of catch. This proved to be the key factor in explaining why
capital will keep rising while both the fish stock and the catch decline. The
qualitative simulation reveals that all fisheries described by the general model
necessarily undergo a phase of over-capitalization. It also shows other inherent
and – in the sense of political interventions – serious system properties, e.g.
critical branchings and potentially recurring boom-and-bust cycles.
Future work will run along several lines. Different policy measures can be
assessed by incorporating them into the qualitative model and comparing the
resulting graphs. Also a multi-species module, together with more detailed mod-
els of decision making in fisheries could enhance the results. Some other efforts
are related to an integration of hard and soft knowledge in one model approach.
In particular model approaches comprising a module for cooperative negotia-
tions and allows to test which management strategies are applicable in a fishery
under additional settings, e.g. normative sustainability targets, are examined
(see, e.g. Kropp et al., 2004; Eisenack et al., 2005). Summing up, we feel that
the results and the technique open a promising road towards new insights in the
dynamics and management of fishery systems.
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A Annex
The annex completes the qualitative constraints derived from the bio-economic
model (cf. Eqs. (20)–(23)) and the assumptions made in section 3. These con-
straints are translated to the specific model code necessary to run the qualitative
simulation software.
The relationship between stock x and harvest h is defined by the relations
in Eq. (3) and expressed by constraint (C.1a) in the subsequent table. The
recruitment is given by a U-shaped function R(x), defined in Eqs. (4)–(9) and
expressed by constraint (C.1b). To describe the change of fish stock x˙ = R− h,
the complete model needs more than Eq. (10). The derivative x˙ is increasing
with R and decreasing with h. In addition, if h becomes zero, x˙ changes in the
same direction as R and if R vanishes, x˙ changes in the opposite direction to h.
Since RMSY =MSY , x˙ = 0 if R = RMSY and h =MSY :
if R = 0 and h = 0 then x˙ = 0,
if R = RMSY and h = MSY then x˙ = 0,
if R < RMSY and h > MSY then x˙ > 0, (26)
if R˙ > 0 and h˙ < 0 then x¨ > 0,
if R˙ < 0 and h˙ > 0 then x¨ < 0.
These expressions are equivalent to those which are encoded in the qualitative
constraint (C.1c). The constraints for the harvest supply function h(x, k) are
already defined in Eq. (24) and expressed by constraint (C.2a). In addition,
Eq. (12) states that the negative marginal costs −vk increase in h and decrease
in x and k. Thus,
if h˙ > 0 and x˙ < 0 and k˙ < 0 then − v˙k > 0,
if h˙ < 0 and x˙ > 0 and k˙ > 0 then − v˙k < 0,
(27)
which is expressed by the constraint (C.2b), where vk is replaced bymvk := −vk
for technical reasons. Taking into account Eq. (23) it is obvious that the change
of capital stock is increasing with I and decreasing with k. If k vanishes, k˙
changes in the same direction as I, if I vanishes, k˙ changes in the opposite
direction to k, yielding
if I = 0 and k = 0 then k˙ = 0,
if I˙ > 0 and k˙ < 0 then k¨ > 0,
if I˙ < 0 and k˙ > 0 then k¨ < 0, (28)
if I˙ = 0 then sgn(k¨) = −sgn(k˙),
if k˙ = 0 then sgn(k¨) = sgn(I˙).
The relationship between k˙ and I is represented by (C.3). Finally, referring to
Eq. (22), the change of investment has the form I˙ = f(I) + g(vk) with strictly
monotonic increasing functions f and g which vanish at zero. Thus,
if I = 0 and vk = 0 then I˙ = 0,
if I˙ > 0 and v˙k > 0 then I¨ > 0,
if I˙ < 0 and v˙k < 0 then I¨ < 0, (29)
if I˙ = 0 then sgn(I¨) = sgn(v˙k),
if v˙k = 0 then sgn(I¨) = sgn(I˙),
which is encoded in the constraint (C.4). Again we change vk to −vk. The
constraints, expressed by a set of comprehensible and recurring keywords, are
summarized in the following table:
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Index Example Interpretation
(C.1a) ((M+ x h) (0 0)) ∃f : h = f(x), f(0) = 0, fx(x) > 0
(C.1b) ((U- x R) (xmsy Rmsy) (0 0) (Q 0)) ∃f : R = f(x), f(xMSY ) = RMSY , f(0) = 0,
f(Q) = 0;∀x < xMSY : fx(x) > 0;
∀x > xMSY : fx(x) < 0.
(C.1c) ((add dx h R) (0 0 0) (0 MSY Rmsy)) x˙+ h = R ≡ x˙ = R− h, 0 +MSY = RMSY
(C.2a) (((M + +) k x h)) ∃f : h = f(x, k), fk > 0, fx > 0
(C.2b) (((M - + +) h x k mvk)) ∃f : −vk = f(h, x, k), fh < 0, fx > 0, fk > 0
(C.3) ((add dk k I) (0 0 0)) k˙ + k = I ⇔ k˙ = I − k
(C.4) ((add dI mvk I) (0 0 0)) I˙ + (−vk) = I
Additional constraints for derivatives and exclusion of marginal cases are:
(C.5) ((d/dt x dx)) x˙ = d
dt
x
(C.6) ((cornot x dx) (xmsy 0)) ∀t : x(t) 6= xMSY ∨ x˙(t) 6= 0,
i.e. it is forbidden that x = xMSY and
x˙ = 0 at the same time
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